

# **Livelihoods in crisis:** a longitudinal study in Pader, Uganda Year two update

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The Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI is one of the world's leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

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# 1. Introduction

Some two million people, about 90% of the population of the three Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, were forced into IDP camps during 20 years of brutal war in Northern Uganda. The conflict was characterised by extreme violence against the civilian population, including the abduction of tens of thousands of children and adults (Pham, Vinck and Stover, 2007). The population also suffered intense overcrowding in the camps, leading to exceptionally high mortality rates (Checci, 2006) with, eventually, almost no access to land outside the camp perimeter. Since people in Acholiland are predominantly farmers, the result was a collapse in independent livelihoods and an almost universal reliance on food aid and other humanitarian assistance.

Most analysis in emergency contexts is based on a snapshot of current conditions and livelihoods, and food security assessments are also usually carried out on a one-off basis. Despite the growing sophistication of livelihoods assessment techniques, very few studies give a picture of how livelihoods adapt during ongoing crises. In partnership with Evidence for Development and Mercy Corps, in 2006 the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) attempted to address this gap by initiating a research study in Northern Uganda that would follow a small sample of households over time.

The start of the study coincided with the cessation of hostilities between the LRA and the government of Uganda, and the beginning of a peace process. This has resulted in a relatively peaceful two years, with significant improvements in the humanitarian situation as people return to their villages and start to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. However, the final outcome of the peace process is still uncertain and there can be no doubt that the next few years will be difficult for the civilian population, with a continuing need for external assistance and a major reconstruction effort.

The pace of return has been uneven, and in our study area it has been slower than in neighbouring sub-districts. Most of the population remain in camps, having either moved to 'satellite' sites closer to their homes or chosen to stay in the now less congested 'mother' camps.

According to OCHA, by June 2008 only 18% of the estimated 2005 camp population of 1.1 million had actually moved back to their villages of origin (OCHA, 2008b). LRA leader Joseph Kony's refusal

to sign a peace deal in April 2008, followed by reports of LRA activity and rumours in June of military plans to move against the LRA, stoked fears that the LRA might return, making many people reluctant to risk moving all the way home. Nonetheless, there has been a significant improvement in the operational context, and since 2007 aid agencies have been winding down emergency operations and adopting a framework of 'transition' and 'recovery'.

The main focus of this report is on the challenges arising from these new circumstances, which require new ways of working, new criteria for targeting aid and different types of funding and assistance. The study has provided detailed observation over the last two years, providing a unique insight into the process of recovery. The sample we are following is made up of a cross-section of households, from the poorest to the most well-off, with a great variety of strengths and vulnerabilities and different capacities to promote their own recovery.

While our study has focused on two small areas and is not designed to describe specific needs throughout the region, its implications are relevant to evolving policies and programming across Northern Uganda. But the points raised are also relevant more broadly and will, we hope, contribute to understanding of livelihoods in transition elsewhere.

Our findings show that a relatively simple set of tools can be used to gain an understanding of household livelihoods in real time, to better inform the phasing out of relief and the design and targeting of new interventions. The study also underlines the diversity of individual household needs during this period of transition, a diversity that is not widely recognised. Some households are manifestly better able than others to re-establish self-reliant livelihoods and agencies, including government, UN organisations and NGOs, need to understand the reason for their success. This information is necessary for cost-effective programming, to determine when to phase out particular types of relief and to decide when other measures, including social protection programmes, can be introduced to help less able groups make the transition from relief-based livelihoods (Longley et al., 2006).

Needs in Northern Uganda remain enormous. However, funding of the international consolidated

appeal (CAP) had, by mid-2008, only achieved 45% of its target (OCHA, 2008c), and the World Food Programme (WFP) was predicting a shortfall in its Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) of 49,285MT for the second half of 2008 (FEWSNET, 2008). In these circumstances, it is crucial for agencies to get the targeting and phasing out of relief right.

## 1.1 Report outline

This report is the second from the Humanitarian Policy Group's longitudinal study of 'Livelihoods in Crisis' in Northern Uganda. Following an inception period during which the project was established, the first data collected on the sample population and an initial report published, this report gives a fuller picture of the sample group during a complete agricultural cycle (2007–2008).

The study produces a report, presenting and analysing the changes that the sample households and their communities have experienced during the year. In this report, we look at the first full year of transition following the start of the peace process and wide-scale movement of households from the main IDP 'mother' camps to satellite camps and villages.

This section introduces the study. Section 2 uses a Household Economy Approach to build on the overview of livelihoods in Pader presented in the Inception Report. Section 3 provides an analysis of individual household economy data from the sample group over the past year, comparing this with data collected during the inception period. The final section discusses some of the implications of these findings.

## 1.2 The study

The study has followed a sample of households (initially 30) over a two-year timeframe to investigate the main economic, social and political issues affecting their livelihoods. The households came originally from two villages in neighbouring parishes in Lira Palwo sub-county, Pader district, before being forced into a large 'mother' camp in Lira Palwo, between 4km and 8km away from their home villages. By April 2008, most people in our sample had left Lira Palwo and relocated the few kilometres to a transitional resettlement site (TRS) at Obolokome. Obolokome is in the parish of one of the villages from which our sample is drawn. It has a school, two boreholes and an (empty) dispensary. It is close enough for many to reach their original agricultural land; however, people

are still living in the camp context of the TRS, constructing their huts mainly on borrowed land.

Some of those from the more distant parish have gone further down the same road, which peters out into a track before crossing the Agago River, and have joined a spontaneously formed camp site at Aywee Keyo, where there is a bomb-damaged but functional school and a borehole. About 15–20 'pioneering' households had re-established themselves around the newly rehabilitated water pump in Aywee Keyo at the time of the study. A handful of households originating from Aywee Keyo remained in the old 'mother' camp, as they lacked the resources to move to the newer sites.

### Box 1: Medair Uganda (2007) mortality and morbidity survey, Agago County

During the last reference period, a second annual mortality and morbidity survey of Agago County was conducted by Medair covering January to September 2007. The survey sampled 11 IDP sites (five former mother camps and newer satellite camps). Both the overall crude mortality rate (CMR) and the under-five mortality rate (U5 MR) were found to have decreased since the last survey. The main self-reported causes were malaria and respiratory infections; violence was the next most common known cause of death. However, the results were hugely variable from camp to camp. Two sites experienced rates of 1.16 and 1.07, which is above the SPHERE emergency threshold (1.0), while two sites had rates of 0.36 and 0.37, which is below the average for sub-Saharan Africa (0.44). Mother camps were found to have better rates than satellite camps, which the study attributed to the lack of or distance from health services in the satellite camps.

#### 1.2.1 Agro-ecological context

Prior to the conflict, most of this population were homesteaders. A Household Economy Assessment (HEA) carried out for the study last year described the area as part of a single 'loamy clay soil mixed agriculture livelihood zone'. It has flat and low lands with moderate fertility loamy clay soils suitable for both crop and livestock production. Traditionally, the main food crops grown were cereals such as sorghum, maize, finger millet and rice. Oil crops included soya, groundnuts, sunflower seeds and simsim (sesame), and people grew pulses such as beans, cow peas and green

## Box 2: John and Margaret<sup>1</sup>

Like almost everyone else in their community, John and Margaret lost all their material assets when they were forced to flee from their village in 2002. They have a large family, with seven of their own children and an orphaned niece. The children are aged between two and 16 years. At our first assessment, John was doing reasonably well – he ranked 15<sup>th</sup> out of 28 in the initial (2006–2007) wealth distribution. However, John was one of the first to move back to Obolokome, he was one of the few to harvest cotton in 2007 and by 2007–2008 he had the second highest income in the sample, and the highest income among farming families (the wealthiest household is headed by a teacher). The reasons for this success are a combination of household labour capacity, land access, relentless hard work and a clear objective, in this case, to send all their children to secondary school.

WFP food rations continue to provide a large proportion of the household's food needs: around 50% of their total calorie requirements (the household of ten has been allocated ration cards for nine people). John and Margaret have benefited from NGO seed fairs over the last year and they participate in the revolving credit scheme run by a group of households with initial training by an NGO. Cotton seeds and inputs (pesticides and fertiliser) were provided by Dunavant, the company which also buys and markets the crop.<sup>2</sup>

John, his wife and two of the older children all contribute to household income. In addition to crop income of around Ush 243,000, the household earned a further Ush 218,000 from agricultural work, mainly done by John, with additional income from his wife and eldest daughter. John also earned around Ush 200,000 from house construction and making granaries. His son earned around Ush 40,000 from bicycle taxi work in the holidays, and Margaret earned around Ush 72,000 from brewing. Thus, household demography, and the point this household has reached in its lifecycle, clearly plays a major role in its success.

Access to land and relationships with family members can also be critical to household prosperity, and this is true in John's case. Before displacement, the family farmed jointly with John's father and four brothers. His father is now dead and of the four brothers, one is working in Kampala, one is a soldier, one works with an NGO in Pader and the fourth is also a farmer in Obolokome. In 2007 the brothers agreed on a division of the land, and John now has six acres of his own. There are currently no land disputes and relations among the siblings are good, to the extent that one of John's children's school fees is paid by the brother who is an NGO employee. They have no other help from remittances. John's household is also one of the few that has benefited from the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) restocking project. His inclusion in the small group, led by a teacher, may owe something to a reputation for reliability and hard work, but clan relationships are also likely to have played a part.

In terms of his plans and perceived prospects, John sees dry season brick making and construction and sale of cotton and other higher value crops such as groundnuts as his main income sources in the short term. In the longer term, he talks about managing a small family business, but is held back in this ambition by 'Low savings since I have to pay two of my children in secondary school, high outgoings on basic needs for the family, and limited labour for agricultural activities, since the children are in school'. If he had additional income his priorities would be to pay school fees, hire labour, buy oxen and put money into a small business. John noted that everyone had suffered from the poor quality of seeds distributed by one NGO, and were held back by a lack of basic hand tools.

chickens. The other main livelihood activities included fishing, hunting, natural resource exploitation, petty trade/brewing, some sale of small livestock and casual agricultural labour, particularly among the poorest households. The area has relatively good access to major markets in the district, such as Pader town, Patongo and

Omot. However, the poor road network and conditions, which affect the whole district, are a major constraint on trade.

By the time of this study, nearly all livestock had been killed or looted and people had spent many years unable to access their agricultural lands. Instead, they had to rely heavily on external

<sup>1</sup> Names have been changed throughout.

<sup>2</sup> Inputs are purchased for cash, rather than on credit. Although this lowers the risk of debt if the crop fails,

relatively few households have the capital needed for the initial investment

assistance and a range of coping strategies, often involving great risk – for example, venturing out of the protected camp areas to fish or gather wild foods. Over the last two years, people across the district have been returning to many of their traditional economic activities and, with the concentration of people and commercial activity in the main camps, these sites have become even more significant centres of trade. Goods are starting to move between the transitional sites, the old mother camps and on to the major towns as people start to farm again.

Activities such as brick making for building new houses and labour in NGO ‘cash for work’ programmes (such as road building) have also provided significant sources of income for some people. Many others, however, continue to struggle even in this improved context. The following case examples describe two of the households in the study, and illustrate some of the factors that influence a household’s capacity to survive and prosper without external assistance. Whilst these circumstances will change, the immediate implications can be usefully applied to humanitarian assistance today; these implications are discussed further in the last section of the report.

### *1.2.2 Who prospers, who fails?*

The purpose of the case stories presented here and later in this report is to highlight the potential strengths as well as the constraints that determine a household’s ability to support itself. In boxes 2 and 3 we see two households that are in many ways similar, but currently have very different economic profiles. While the first household is prospering the second, although having relatively ‘high potential’, has been far less fortunate.

Many households that are similar in other respects fare far worse than John’s because they lack the crucial assets of household labour and easy access to their own land. John can also afford to extend his cultivation using animal traction. (He hired oxen this year, at a cost of Ush 30,000 per acre, but is investing in cattle and no doubt will soon have his own ox and plough.) The next example illustrates these points.

### *1.2.3 Key research questions and methodology*

These examples give substance to some of the underlying questions which are analysed in more quantitative terms later in the report. For example:

### **Box 3: Simon and Beth**

There are 12 people in Simon’s household, including young people and children aged between two and 19 years. Before displacement, Simon’s situation was similar to John’s: he cultivated millet, groundnuts, simsim, cotton and sorghum on five acres. However, unlike John, Simon has not been able to access his own land. He currently pays Ush 15,000 to rent two acres of land from a neighbour in the TRS and needs to use this land to supplement his WFP rations, as the household only has ration cards for nine of the 12 household members. WFP rations amount to just under 30% of the household income. Unlike John’s household, Simon’s has not accessed cotton inputs from Dunavant, they have not been recipients in the seed distributions and fairs that NGOs have run in the area (as they had not relocated to the TRS when the distributions were made), and they have not benefited from the NUSAF programme.

Simon’s wife, Beth, brews using sorghum grown with seeds donated last year by an NGO. Although Beth made a similar amount of cash to John’s wife, the household’s income from casual labour was lower. Local labour markets require further study, but it seems that ‘host community’ members such as John may have better access to casual work than temporary residents. Unlike John’s son, Simon’s teenage son cannot do bicycle transport because he cannot afford the 18,000 Ush fee required for a licence. Simon plans to start cultivation on his own land later this year, growing millet, beans, cotton and simsim, but he has no animal traction. Assistance to open up land would clearly improve his situation.

- How are people sustaining themselves?
- How significant a part of people’s livelihoods is relief assistance?
- How appropriately and effectively is relief targeted and delivered?
- In what ways could relief assistance better assist people’s livelihoods?
- What are the key factors that determine the success or failure of household livelihood transition from displacement to resettlement or return?

We have used the individual household model (IHM) to measure the economic status of the sample households on an annual basis;



households are visited every six months to update information on employment and production and changes in demography. This allows the study to monitor in real time livelihood strategies, assets, human resources and outcomes. Household economy information is supported by detailed biographical/life history information (selected examples are presented here), and local researchers add depth to these enquiries, leading focus group discussions into clan and other social relationships, experience of conflict, gender relations, land access, legal issues, etc. An HEA

exercise was carried out in September 2007 to give a broader overview of the local economy in transition and to contextualise the individual household study. This will be updated periodically to monitor changes across the wider area. Similarly, we review the structures that have been put in place by the government and the UN to support development at individual, household and community level, including the restoration of health and education services, water and roads.



## 2. Livelihoods in transition

The Inception Report (HPG, 2007) drew on a review of literature and a ‘profiling’ of the district at the beginning of the study. This provides an overview of the context in which the study is located, including historic livelihood patterns. There have been several studies of livelihoods in Northern Uganda during displacement. Stites et al. (2006) provides the best examination of the livelihoods of those living in displacement camps in Kitgum prior to the August 2006 truce agreement. Since then, the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) has carried out large-scale surveys over the last three years in Kitgum and Pader, focusing on the lives of young men and women. During this time, massive movements and changes have occurred.

Our study used an HEA assessment to provide a rapid update of livelihood strategies in the study area in 2006/2007. Annex 1 shows the characteristics of the wealth groups, according to the HEA analysis, highlighting differences in assets and economic activities between the wealth groups in the displacement sites. The main factors of socio-economic differentiation include access to land, livestock owned, household labour and level of income. The assessment observed two distinct types of economies in the study area with different types and levels of economic activities: one in the mother camps and one in the TRSs. The mother camps, being older, have stronger, longer-established markets and enjoy advantages due to better road access to main regional market hubs in Northern Uganda, while the TRSs have smaller markets that are highly reliant on trade with the mother camps.

At the time of the Inception Report, the better-off group were characterised by (1) salaried employment; (2) better access to rented land in the ‘mother camp’; and (3) a ration card with correct household data (or in some cases a ration card or cards reflecting earlier demography rather than current household numbers). Poorer households earned most of their income from activities with a low return, such as firewood sales and cutting grass.

One year on, the HEA report found that the main characteristics of the better-off and worse-off had not changed significantly. However, HEA analysis (corroborated by our individual household data) suggests that a group of ‘higher potential’ farmers is emerging. These households are now cultivating cash crops and have started to use animal

traction; they aim to open up more land in the coming agricultural season and are maximising cash income through a range of activities including construction work, brick making and brewing. They are benefiting from traditional informal structures and institutions that allow them to return to their lands, and they have the labour capacity within their households to clear land and cultivate. We will be tracking their progress, and that of households that fare badly, over the next critical year of transition, to see to what extent formal and non-formal policies and institutions are assisting or inhibiting their social and economic wellbeing.

Despite the need for ox ploughs, restocking in the study area is only slowly taking place and, with continuing Karamojong raids, households remain cautious about investing in expensive livestock (see also Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). In our study population, only one group, headed by a teacher, had been able to acquire cattle through the NUSAF programme. This programme has many critics among our study population, partly explained by the comments of one beneficiary, set out in Box 4.

The HEA found that the main IDP ‘mother’ camps, sited at existing centres with good communication, continued to be centres of trade, despite the disruption caused by insecurity. The increase in population and significant amount of humanitarian assistance led to an expansion in some types of activity in these camps (bars, video shops, bicycle repairs, brewing, charcoal making). The HEA found that constraints on re-establishing viable agricultural livelihoods were common to both mother camp and satellite (TRS) economies in the improved security context, where almost every household is seeking to increase agriculture production. The main problems were:

1. Limited availability of draft power or access to cost-effective low resource and appropriate agricultural technology.
2. Inadequate extension services for promoting good agronomic practices, particularly to grow new variety seeds, and animal husbandry.
3. Limited access to higher-profit markets including the municipal market in Lira and markets in West Nile (Arua) and Kampala, or to the most profitable markets of all, across the border in Southern Sudan (Nimule, Yei and Juba). This is due to the

**Box 4: A description of the community-level group grant application process under the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project by a local farmer**

The NUSAF project was launched in Lira Palwo main camp and in my own area of settlement, Obolokome TRS camp, through a ‘community sensitisation meeting’. During this meeting the NUSAF sub-county team covered issues related to the overall project goal and objectives and requested us to form beneficiary groups, of a specific number of members and who would be named, for purposes of accessing funds. Subsequently we formed a group of 40 people and elected a chairperson, a secretary and other leaders to manage the group.

After about two weeks’ time, our group leaders went and collected the paper forms [for registering the group] from Pader district NUSAF office. However, the main challenge we faced was how to correctly fill in the forms, which at least required a highly learned member within the group. Some of the groups that had been formed, particularly those without any highly learned member such as a teacher or health worker, were forced to hire people to fill in the forms.

After a week or two, we eventually managed to fill and submit the forms to the NUSAF district office. But it was only groups that applied for cattle restocking project whose applications were approved not the groups that applied for small livestock (chicken, goats and pigs). In the whole of Obolokome TRS only two groups were successful funded.

Other groups were told to wait for NUSAF phase II funding. This is exactly how so many households; particularly the poorest female-headed households were excluded from the NUSAF programme in Obolokome TRS camp.

Later the members of groups such as mine, whose project application was approved, were requested to contribute 2,000Ush to open group bank accounts in Lira district with Stanbic bank. The main signatories of the account are the chairperson and treasurer of the group. Our group leaders then submitted the account details to NUSAF Pader district office. NUSAF deposited 14 million Ush in the account for the group in which I am a member. We then selected some group members who purchased 32 head of cattle for the group.

The group sat for a meeting, during which members agreed for two people to co-own one cow each and once it gives birth to a female calf, it’s passed to the immediate partner. However, if it is a male calf then it would have to grow and be used for animal traction, in order to produce more food. The harvest would later be sold to buy a cow for your partner in the group.

Other items to be bought using the 14 million Ush are animal treatment drugs and renting of a kraal as well as planting of trees. All this is to be managed by the group leadership, although technically implemented by district NUSAF and veterinary staff.

Our challenges:

- Lack of adequate knowledge in filling the forms also resulted in disqualification of some applications.
- Lack of good social contracts which covers likely disputes emanating from people in different villages and parishes sharing the same livestock, yet with ongoing resettlement monitoring of multiplication process may prove difficult.

bad state of the feeder road network and poor transport services.

4. Low food crop prices and unfavourable financing terms offered by private sector enterprises, for crops such as cotton and tobacco.

5. Lack of initial capital for small-scale business enterprises.

6. High cost of social services, particularly secondary education, which was unaffordable for the ‘poor’ and ‘middle’ households in both the main and transitional camps.

7. Low literacy levels, which have reduced the effective participation of poor people in major government projects such as the NUSAF, National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and large private enterprise schemes such as Dunavant cotton.
8. High level of rainfall and flooding in late 2007, which is likely to affect the 2008 crop harvest and processing.

A higher percentage of 'better-off' and 'middle' wealth groups were identified in the mother camps, and thus a higher percentage of 'poorer' ones in the resettlement sites. The majority of the 'middle' and 'better-off' households have members who are employed in the formal sector, such as teachers and healthcare and local government workers, but these groups also include enterprising subsistence farmers, local traders and beneficiaries of the NUSAF restocking project. People who had lived close to the camp before the war were more likely to prosper than IDPs from more distant communities. In other words, the host community of the mother camps was better placed to maintain livelihoods than those displaced to it, and having kinship ties to that host community made it easier to cope in the camp, and especially to access land.

However, the ability of households or individuals to cope with displacement depends on a combination of circumstances, which cannot be generalised according to location in mother camp or TRS. As the need for general food rations declines, it becomes increasingly important to consider how assistance is targeted, how relief aid is phased out and how recovery assistance is phased in. As well as rehabilitation of agriculture and markets, this should include longer-term social protection programmes that converge with approaches that are being piloted across the rest of the country. The following section describes the framework for relief and rehabilitation that is currently in place, and some of the challenges facing renewal in Pader District.

## 2.1 Provision and co-ordination of assistance

Logically, this section should start with a summary of the amounts of money available for reconstruction in Pader, under different sectors (health, education, agricultural extension, watsan, roads), and a description of the mechanisms for dispersal through various government ministries and non-governmental organisations. We would then map out the investments intended for our

study at sub-county level (Lira Palwo) and monitor the impact, for example of road improvements, extension services or school building, on households included in the study.

Predictably, perhaps, this analysis is not possible. Planning budgets for the district are available, but up-to-date actual allocations and expenditures are not. The biggest district allocation last year was for education and funds were allocated for the construction of eight schools through the 'school facilities grant'. Large allocations for infrastructure included funds for 21 boreholes and seven springs, and construction of housing for health workers. However, consolidated data on achievements is lacking. Discussions with officials indicated that local government lacks the human resource capacity to manage its own departments' activities, let alone the much larger activities of the international presence.

At the end of 2007, Pader District was hosting at least 43 different humanitarian organisations (25 INGOs, eight national NGO/CBOs, the Ugandan Red Cross, the ICRC and seven UN agencies). At the time this study began in 2006, the government of Uganda was attempting to take a greater role in the international humanitarian response, particularly through coordinating and tracking the work of these agencies, through both the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the District Authorities. District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs) were being established in some districts, with the support of UNDP, led by the district Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), mandated to oversee emergency planning and response in the district.

We interviewed staff of major INGOs working in Lira Palwo, district and sub-county officials and UN agency representatives (WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR). It is clear that the complex 'system', made up of interlocking and overlapping agencies and organisations, is not working smoothly. Local governments would like to increase their coordination and oversight role, but NGOs appear reluctant to cooperate. Many NGO staff do not fully trust local government staff; furthermore, NGOs do not have confidence in local government, and so see little value in working with it.

On the government side, some district staff welcomed the so-called 'cluster' approach to humanitarian coordination, led by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the IASC/UN country team. They reported that, by dividing

Table 1: Agencies active in Lira Palwo sub-county by activity

Camp Coordination & Camp Management (CCCM)	UNHCR, ASB
Education	UNICEF, WCH-UK, BRACK, MC, CESVI
Food Security & Agricultural Livelihoods	WFP, FAO, DOK, CARE, FHI, WVI, CESVI, MC
Governance, Infrastructure & Livelihoods (GIL)	ACORD, WORUDET, MC, CARE
MINE ACTION	WVI
Health, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS	WHO, AVSI, COOPI, CESVI, CCF, AVSI, AMREF, MTI, WFP, PSI
Protection (Human Rights, Rule of Law, Child, GBV)	UNHCR, OHCHR, ICRC, CMCC, CCF, CARE, ACORD, WORUDET
Environmental Conservation	WFP, MC
Shelter & NFI	ASB, ICRC, WCH-UK
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH)	FHI, IAS, IMC, MC, CESVI, AMREF, COOPI, ICRC

coordination into ‘clusters’ led by the appropriate district official (e.g. the district water officer leading the watsan cluster meetings), the DDMC was ‘less overwhelmed’. NGO aid workers, however, questioned the system’s usefulness for their work, and reported that they were yet to see its ‘value added’. For example, there was little incentive for NGO managers, most of whom are under enormous pressure to spend budgets to deadlines, to dedicate long hours to coordination meetings, which they perceive as frustratingly slow and unproductive.

### 2.1.1 Coordination and planning

This problem partly reflects conflicting agendas and priorities, in which some humanitarian aid workers are still considering how to finish emergency projects, while district officials are looking through a lens of five-year development plans, the government’s ‘Parish Approach’ and the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP).<sup>3</sup> In our study district a government official with a key role in this process felt that there had been a reduced level of coordination in the past year, and suggested that this was due to a shift from urgent short-term emergency work in the mother camps, with a smaller number of actors who were familiar with each other, to a situation where a number of new actors were coordinating less efficiently in more formalised systems. However, the cluster system is new to humanitarian work globally and during the study period was evidently building its capacity. Significant staff recruitment to support the system was taking place; the practical outcomes of this drive should be evident in the coming year.

<sup>3</sup> For further discussion of the institutional arrangements and funding challenges facing transition, see *From Emergency to Recovery: Rescuing Northern Uganda’s Transition*, Oxfam Briefing Paper 118, September 2008.

### 2.1.2 The ‘Parish Approach’

Since the peace initiative started, the government of Uganda has encouraged assistance agencies to adopt a ‘transitional’ approach to their work and to coordinate and design it at the local administrative level – hence the ‘Parish Approach’. The approach has been endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee in Uganda as a strategy for transition from relief to development (OPM, 2007a).

The approach sees agencies planning and coordinating their work at the district level, to provide specified basic services according to parish-wide needs rather than within displacement camps. This work is meant to link with PRDP, which itself is intended to contribute to the national Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).

#### Box 5: Allocation of Parish Approach basic services to each cluster

Responsibility for the implementation of the Parish Approach shall be allocated as follows:

1. Basic health service – *Health, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS Cluster*
2. Basic education materials and infrastructure – *Education Cluster*
3. Provision of safe water – *WASH cluster*
4. Stimulation of livelihoods – *FSAL and GIL clusters (joint responsibility)*
5. Opening of roads – *FSAL and GIL clusters (joint responsibility)*
6. Enhancement of civil administration (avoidance of camp management structures) – *Protection and CCCM clusters (joint responsibility)*
7. Further development of Rule of Law through continued deployment of police and judges – *Protection cluster*

The difference the Parish Approach has made in practice is debatable. The approach rightly emphasises the role of the state in the provision of services to the population; however, the ability of government officials to coordinate or deliver assistance is severely restricted by a lack of capacity at the district level and below. For example, the Ministry of Local Government's own assessment of staffing, capacity and institutional strength (Local Governments in Northern Uganda (RoU 2006)) recorded huge gaps in staffing. In the Acholi sub-region it noted that only 37% of the staff establishment was filled and that the revenue sources available for local governments were insufficient to meet the wage bill of even the existing partial staffing level.

The sub-county of Lira Palwo where our study is taking place is a good example of these problems. In the last two years, the sub-county has had two sub-county chiefs. The sub-county accountant is presently acting as the sub-county chief and covering two sub-counties instead of the single one for which he is nominally responsible. While funding levels overall were found to be inadequate, the study also heard of examples of earmarked funding that was available but was not spent due to a lack of capacity to implement the necessary work. The Assistant Chief Administrative Officer for the district expressed fear that emergency programmes had been wound down much faster than the district was able to scale up implementation of (and receive funds for) the PRDP, and so would not be able to fill the gap in provision of basic services as people move home to their parishes.

### *2.1.3 Local governance and return policies*

Across the Acholi districts, even though much of the population has moved closer to home, most people have moved once again into camps or camp-like arrangements (TRSs, decongestion sites or spontaneous sites). In our study area, the TRS is organised in the same way as the original camps, with block leaders and camp commanders who continue to play a more prominent role than the locally elected (LCI and LCII) representatives. One reason for this is that, while many people may have moved closer to home, they have not necessarily moved to their own parish. Even those who have moved beyond the TRS but still not reached their original homesteads have settled around the primary school and its well in a camp-like arrangement, and elected a 'camp commander' to represent them.

It should be remembered that, during the conflict, the role of local government in providing basic services was replaced with systems of camp leadership and military control, and humanitarian assistance was controlled, administered and coordinated by the agencies delivering it. Camps were organised into 'blocks' of huts, with a leader elected by the block households. A camp commander was the chief interlocutor for the camp, who should also have been elected. Thus, during the years of displacement Local Councils did not play a significant role, especially at the ward and parish levels (LCs I and II). However, it is through these LC representatives that aid actors are now expected to work in planning and implementing their activities. The Parish Approach is premised on the idea that, while people may still be living in camps, they are now back at their 'home' parish. In principle, their LC II should therefore represent them again, and their needs should be seen within a framework of long-term development.

Nevertheless, despite the government's wish to introduce the Parish Approach, based on the national LC administration and parish-level development planning, aid agencies have had little choice but to work with the structure and organisation that is actually in place, which is predominantly camp-based. It seems likely that full adoption of the Parish Approach will be delayed until people have moved back at least to their original parishes and see a functioning system of local councillors, sub-district Community Development Officers and committees, planning and delivering services.

The Office of the Prime Minister has nevertheless produced guidelines for the phasing out of camps and all the Acholi districts now have official 'Camp Phase Out Committees', tasked with assessing conditions in order to close camps or recommend interventions to help transform camps into sustainable communities. The guidelines and the national IDP Policy are committed to voluntary and free movement, yet there have been reports from aid agencies of officials in some districts blocking agencies from working in former mother camps because they want them closed. When people have moved out of camps, their former huts have been destroyed, in some cases as an official policy (RI, 2008). Whilst there is clearly considerable pressure for camps to close, our data shows that, in addition to concerns regarding freedom of movement and choice, for some people moving out of a mother camp or TRS and establishing a

viable livelihood elsewhere may be impossible without significant assistance.

#### *2.1.4 Aid and assistance*

The parishes in the area of this study have continued to see most of the population residing in TRSs, remaining heavily reliant on WFP food aid as they slowly rebuild their agriculture production. They also face huge unmet needs in both transition sites and home areas with respect to safe water supply, health services and education infrastructure. As we discuss in the next section, the assistance they have received in this period, while valuable, has only partly matched their needs, and with respect to re-establishing livelihoods may be of less significance than their own efforts to assist themselves.

Our study area has not been the target of large amounts of assistance in the last two years. Since the establishment of the TRS and movement out of Lira Palwo mother camp, emergency programming has ceased and only one agency has a continuing presence in the TRS area. During the study period, livelihoods programming has largely consisted of continued food assistance, cash for work (CFW) on a road and seed distributions. Several small and unsuccessful short-lived projects, such as nurseries and school gardens, have come and gone with little positive impact, and focus groups could list very precisely the NGOs and their interventions working in their community, and rate as either 'good' or 'bad' the projects or services provided over the last two to three years.

Unsuccessful projects were dismissed as a waste of money, but of particular concern in every focus group discussion was the very poor quality of non-food items (NFIs). This included household items such as cooking pots and jerry cans, which lasted

only a few months (and were not replaced), distributions of poor-quality seeds that failed to germinate and lack of assistance to replace lost agricultural tools at the time when they were needed. One distribution of seeds and tools last year that was constantly referred to involved a derisory number of hand tools, in the order of one per 100 people. The community decided that the best way to distribute these was by lottery. Several informants suggested that the conflict, bitterness and resentment the episode caused was such that it would have been better not to have given anything at all.

A savings and loan scheme introduced by an NGO is considered by beneficiaries to be successful, though it by no means reaches everyone who could use it. A road building (cash for work) scheme also helped some households in our study population, but these were mainly among the middle and better-off, who had labour to spare when the construction was taking place. The TRS had a desperate shortage of clean water for the first year, which has only partially been relieved by a second borehole, installed by an NGO. Sanitation has been poor for the length of the study, though an NGO has been helping the site to improve this over the last year. While more work on sanitation has been planned and was in fact implemented after the reference period covered in this report, there is clearly a significant lag between the conception and implementation of this programme, despite people's willingness to match assistance with their own efforts. Very little assistance has reached the Aywee Keyo site yet; however, the school has reopened and the district has refurbished the handpump on the borehole. Both these factors were critical in people's decision to relocate to this site.



### 3. Changing livelihoods of the study group

Using the Individual Household Model (IHM), the study is tracking a sample of 28 households and looking at changes in their productive capacity, land and other assets and income levels, as well as various social indicators. It also looks at the contribution of relief aid, all types of employment and at trade and small businesses. Through this analysis, we aim to gain a better understanding of the transition process, including the role of humanitarian assistance. In addition to food aid, we have documented other assistance households received from humanitarian agencies.

This study began with a sample of 30 households in 2006; however, analysis of the initial data set and subsequent follow up revealed that two households were actually connected to others in the sample to the extent that they fit the study's definition of a single household. The sample was thus reduced to 28. The households are all from Lira Palwo sub county (Pader), and were all located in 2006 within one of Pader's main IDP 'mother' camps, Lira Palwo camp. The sample was drawn from the displaced population of two villages in adjacent parishes, separated by a river and a swamp. One village (Aringo Pee) is well connected to trading centres and transport routes throughout the year. The second (Aywee Keyo) is cut off from main transport routes for about five months of the year. Baseline data for the sample households, covering the period 2006–2007, is described in the Inception Report. The study has been following them as some move through a transitional resettlement site (Obolokome) towards their original home areas, while others move directly from Lira Palwo camp to their original home area. The purpose of tracking individual households is to understand at a micro level the process of transition from camp-based livelihoods, in which aid has played a major role, to livelihoods that no longer receive external assistance.

This section describes the individual economies of the study households during the period April 2007–March 2008, and compares the current (2008) situation with the previous year. As described in the Inception Report, the sample includes a representative cross-section of households that were 'better off', 'middle' or 'poorer' at the start of the study in 2006.

#### 3.1 The Individual Household Model (IHM)

The IHM was used to analyse the data collected during household interviews; information from the

interviews was recorded on spreadsheets at the end of each day. After cross-checking and any additional follow up, data was entered in the IHM software for analysis and production of charts and other outputs.<sup>4</sup> IHM data for this second assessment was gathered at three points during the agricultural year 2007–2008:

- September 2007
- January 2008
- March 2008

This allowed us to keep individual household interviews reasonably short, to cross-check information, for example on production and employment, and to keep track of people's movements in an increasingly mobile population. Household interviews were carried out by local, Acholi-speaking field staff from Mercy Corps, the study's operational partner.

The September interviews focused on land access and main season crop production; most crops planted in March/April had been harvested by this point. Information on agricultural employment (planting, weeding, harvesting) as well as petty trade, brewing and brick making/construction was also collected.

Interviews carried out in January looked in detail at access to humanitarian assistance, cross-checking sources of seed, yields from donated seeds, productive asset accumulation and changes in the number of ration cards held by the household after a mid-year WFP enumeration exercise. Rations were reduced for a period in mid-2007, and school meals were also reduced. Relevant adjustments were made to the data to take account of these changes. Household histories were updated and information on basic expenditure included in the database. Finally, crops including simsim harvested towards the end of the year were recorded.

Quantitative analysis demonstrates economic outcomes and gives some insight into why certain households are able to accumulate assets and increase their income, while others remain poor. To understand the dynamics of change in more detail, we have been taking life history interviews of the study households and holding focus group

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<sup>4</sup> IHM software has been developed by Evidence for Development's Director of Research, John Seaman, who carried out the data analysis and charting.

discussions with other community members. Among the topics discussed, people have described the problems they currently face in improving their economic situation, their perspectives on the future and how they would use any additional income.

The overwhelming majority of households saw their future security in increasing their income through cash crops such as groundnuts, simsim and cotton, for which they need tools, seeds and, ideally, animal traction (requiring a significant restocking effort). Their spending and investment priorities were also more-or-less universal. They wanted cash to pay secondary school fees and to build up livestock, including oxen. Some of the more ambitious households said they would also invest in property and/or small business. The elderly and disabled wanted to farm and produce crops as much as other groups. This is both understandable and feasible: although they may not have the labour power to clear land, most can plant, weed and harvest. Many programmes dismiss these people as ‘aid dependent’ or in need of long-term social protection. In fact, they need money to pay other people to do the heavy work. They are able and willing to do the rest, earning for themselves the security and dignity handouts do not provide. There can be no clearer example of this than in the case of Matthew and his wife Flora (see Box 6), who have returned to the site of their original home in the TRS. Matthew and Flora offer a good example of a socially ‘integrated’ but vulnerable household.

Next year we will examine the way in which informal clan and extended family institutions have assisted them, for example by providing the additional labour they increasingly require; whether they have been helped by external programmes (and if not, why not) and what changes in policies, programmes or institutional practices would assist them.

The final round of this assessment was carried out in mid-April 2008, when we were able to complete the annual employment calendar and record plans for the coming agricultural season, including the timing of return to home villages. Participants also raised current issues including access to seeds and investment priorities.

Figure 1 shows changes in food income from 2006 to 2008 for the study group as a whole.

#### **Box 6: Matthew and Flora**

Matthew and his wife Flora are an elderly couple, caring for two young orphaned grandchildren, one of whom attends primary school; they were joined by a widowed son towards the end of the assessment period. Matthew has five acres of land in their original home which is located in the TRS. He has been able to cultivate this year, and hopes to rent out the remainder to a temporary TRS resident, giving him Ush 5,000 for the year.

The household had a very difficult year; they earned just Ush 14,000 from agricultural work and Ush 21,000 from selling grass and firewood. To boost their income, Matthew joined an NGO group cultivation scheme, but had to leave due to his advanced age. In addition to WFP rations, which covered just over 40% of their needs, they supplemented their diet with wild fruits collected by Matthew’s wife and grandchildren, and mangoes from the trees they left six years ago.

Their income was not sufficient to meet even basic expenditure. They can only afford light every other day, and have just one piece of soap every week. Matthew reported that ‘some times they even failed to buy soap because of lack of money’. He also has to buy a uniform for the granddaughter at school, which leaves the extremely small sum of Ush 2,000 to buy clothes for himself and his wife once a year.

Despite their age, the household still hopes to raise income next year through crop production and sale of simsim, maize and sorghum. However, they are constrained by lack of draft power and reliance on zero tillage for agricultural work. They would use any additional income to hire draft power and open new land for cotton and simsim: and if their widowed son remains in the household, this aim might be achievable.

The chart shows (i) the continuing importance of WFP food aid, including the general ration and school meals; (ii) the significant reduction in food aid in the latest year; (iii) the rapid replacement of much of the lost food aid, with people’s own production which took place as soon as they were able to access land; and (iv) that average total food income was less in this past year than the year before. The significant increase in production made possible by the greater accessibility of land did not match the reductions

in food aid assistance that people faced in the last year: not everyone was able to exploit the new opportunities to the full. Indeed, our data shows that some households are much worse off than last year, and underlines the need for an understanding of the difficulties that can affect any household (for example, unplanned absences at critical times of the year) – not just those that conform to the stereotype of elderly/single parent, etc.

These findings do not support the idea that people’s desire to re-establish independent livelihoods has been undermined by the provision of food aid. This is a common misconception that is discussed further in the final section of this report and illustrated in the following case study.


NGOs often miss households like Alice’s when they initiate programmes with ‘high potential’ farmers because they fail to look at the specific obstacles that prevent a hard-working household from increasing their cultivation. For example, NGOs often require households to ‘demonstrate their willingness to work’ and only open up with animal traction an area of land equivalent to that which the household has cleared ‘by their own efforts’. It should also be noted that there are currently no mechanisms that allow genuine omissions during an enumeration process to be rectified, so people like Alice can lose savings, income and ration cards as a result of hospitalisation.

**Box 7: Richard and Alice**

Richard and Alice are a married couple with a household of ten family members. The children are young; the oldest son is only ten. Before displacement, this was a well-off family. They had 40 cattle and cultivated around five acres, but now the husband is sick and can do very little agricultural work, and last year one of the children was in hospital, which meant that Alice was also unable to work for several months. The WFP enumeration exercise took place at this time, so neither Anna nor the child was counted and the household of ten now only receives rations for eight.

Alice was involved in an NGO project cultivating one acre with a group of women, from which she harvested 54kg, all of which was consumed by the family. Like other very poor households, her main source of cash income is from the sale of firewood, from which she gained Ush 30,000, supplementing an income of Ush 58,000 from agricultural labour.

Although they are currently the poorest household in the sample, they are not without plans or ambitions. Alice and Richard hope to increase their cash income next year by cultivating groundnuts. This household lacks labour to do the heavy work of opening up land, and the basic hand tools to cultivate. It is therefore unsurprising that Alice said that if she had any additional income, she would hire people to help her in opening land and buy tools. Her longer-term aim is to invest in livestock and eventually to buy oxen.



### 3.2 Reduction in living standards

More than half the sample group had less income in the last year than the year before. Figures 2, 3 and 4 help to demonstrate what this has meant for people in terms of their 'disposable income', which considers how much food people have actually been able to access and the purchasing power of their income for basic needs, both food and non-food. Figure 4 shows the distribution of income for each household in the study population in 2006–2007 and 2007–2008, expressed as 'disposable income per adult equivalent'. Disposable income in this case represents the cash remaining to the household after its very basic food needs have been met. Households that cannot meet these basic needs have a 'negative' disposable income. This means that, for at least part of the year, they go hungry.

We also looked at household capacity to meet basic non-food needs, again taking account of the age and sex of household members. The standard set is the minimum needed for 'social inclusion' according to local norms. This includes fuel, annual replacement of one set of clothes for each member of the household and costs of primary school materials. Households that have an income below the local standard of living threshold are marked in green, those above the threshold are marked in blue. Figures 2 and 3 compare household disposable income in 2006/7 and 2007/8

Comparing 2006-07 with 2007–08 reveals a fall in living standards. In the 2006–07 series, 35.7% (ten) households are below the standard of living threshold, whilst in 2007–08 42.8% (12) are below the standard of living threshold.

This effect is seen most clearly by omitting the wealthiest household, as in 4. The poorest (who may be different households in the two series) are poorer in 2007–2008. Both series are in ascending order of income.

These changes can only be fully explained on a household by household basis.<sup>5</sup> The actual

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<sup>5</sup> The changing prices of food and basic needs over time (inflation or deflation) is captured in our data and reflected in the calculated annual basic food and non-food (standard of living) costs. Measuring household capacity to meet food and non-food needs each year allows a comparison to be made that incorporates inflation; this is shown graphically in the charts.

change in income of each household in the study is shown in Figure 5, which depicts the change in the disposable income per adult equivalent (DI/AE) of each household, comparing round 1 (2006–07) and round 2 (2007–08).<sup>6</sup> Households are in ascending order with 2006–07 income (the blue) shown first. The individual case histories we have documented describe inaccuracies in the enumeration process,<sup>7</sup> sickness at key times of the year or, in the case of the richest household, which includes two teachers, a decision not to invest as much time or money in agricultural production.

Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the important contribution of WFP rations to household income, and the sensitivity of income to a reduction in rations. Households are shown in order of ascending disposable income per adult equivalent for each series.

Note: Figures 6 and 7 show sources of income as food, i.e. 'food income', not total income or disposable income. They do not show food purchase; capacity to purchase food is reflected in Figures 2 and 3.


The increase in crop production, which can be seen clearly in Figure 7 (green bars) partly offset the reduction in WFP food rations and school feeding (blue and yellow bars). This is evidence of people's rapid response to the improved security situation, which allowed more land to be accessed and cleared for cultivation. However, shortage of productive inputs and poor timing of some seed distributions meant that, for many households, the gap caused by the cut in relief aid could not be entirely filled. As already discussed, these production figures belie the notion that the internally displaced population of Pader has an 'aid dependent' mentality.

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
<sup>6</sup> *Disposable income* is the amount of income remaining when basic food needs have been met. Results are expressed as '*adult equivalents*' to allow income comparisons to be made between households with different demographic profiles. See end note for a fuller explanation of terms used in the IHM model.

<sup>7</sup> The enumerators count the number of people physically present in the household on the census day. People who are normally resident but unavoidably absent (for example in hospital) are not counted so they do not receive a ration card. There does not appear to be any means of appealing against inaccuracies of this kind.


**Figure 2: Disposable income/adult equivalent 2007/8 (income of richest household off scale, Ush 900,000)**




**Figure 3: Disposable income/adult equivalent 2006-7 (income of richest household off scale, Ush 1m)**




**Figure 4: Disposable income/adult equivalent, omitting the richest household**



**Figure 5: Changes in individual disposable income, 2006/7–2007/8**



**Figure 6: Proportion of annual food needs from WFP rations, school meals, own production, employment, wild foods and gifts (other than school meals and WFP rations)**



**Figure 7: Sources of food income/adult equivalent**




Table 2: Changes in income 2006/7–2007/8

	WFP rations	School meals	Crop production	Wild foods	Food from Employment	Other gifts	Livestock products
2006/7	647344	117267	92314.2	2653	1258.54	668.	771.8
2007/8	447675	21238	343882.5	12879.	800.77	1739	0
Change	-199,670	-96029	+251568.2	+10226.	-457.77	+1071.	-771.79

Table 2 shows what these changes meant on average, in Kcals/adult equivalent, according to each of the main sources of income.

WFP rations, school meals and food income from employment and livestock income (which was trivial) decreased between 2006/7 and 2007/8. The drop in livestock can be attributed to widespread loss of poultry due to Newcastle disease. This fall was largely matched by an increase in other sources of income, particularly from crops. The increase in crop production is clearly illustrated in the following graphs, which show the change in crop income and income from WFP rations + school meals between 2006–07 and 2007–08 (in order of DI/AE). Except for the richest household (2006–07),<sup>8</sup> crop income has increased substantially for every household.

WFP rations + school meals have fallen for every household. Note the changes that took place to WFP distributions during the year. Rations were only officially reduced for two months in our 2007/2008 reference year, after which they returned to the same levels as our 2006/2007 reference year.

This is not enough to account for the reductions some households experienced. In fact, the results also reflect the WFP enumeration carried out in mid-2007, to verify household sizes and re-register households that had moved since the last enumeration. Many households (including Richard and Alice – see Box 7) saw a reduction in the number of people registered in their household, although this did not always reflect the actual number of household members.

As we have seen, some people are currently unable to meet their basic food requirement. Our study therefore broadly supports WFP's latest Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), which commits WFP to continue general food

rations in 2008/2009 for the present caseload of IDPs in Acholi, Teso and Lango. The PRRO promises to provide people with food on the basis of need whether they are in camps, transit sites or return areas, which will be assessed and adjusted on the basis of land use and nutritional surveys and Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSAs). It anticipates that about half of present IDPs may be in need of food assistance in 2009/2010, but none in 2010/2011, assuming that the peace process continues to progress. While our study also points in a positive direction, with significant increases in crop production and some asset accumulation, it also illustrates the continuing importance of food assistance for the many families who have yet to re-establish their pre-conflict household food security. The notion that all IDPs (or returned IDPs) will be fully self-reliant by 2010/2011 is optimistic. Some of the poorest households will continue to require assistance to meet their basic needs, either through food aid or longer-term social protection. The results of pilot cash transfer schemes being carried out in other parts of the country will be equally important for households in the north.



The reduction in living standards we have seen and the sensitivity to changes in food assistance demonstrate how fragile people's recovery is: a steady upward trajectory of recovery cannot be assumed. The May/June 2008 FEWSNET report on Northern Uganda highlighted the continuing precariousness of people's food security, and bad weather in June and July is likely to mean a poor main harvest, which has already meant that WFP's local purchasing programme has not been able to procure as much food as planned (IRIN, 2008).

Figure 9 shows increased crop production across the income distribution. (The anomaly in the richest household, which is a salaried rather than a farming household, has already been noted.) This increase was possible because, in addition to better land access, NGOs distributed groundnuts, beans, simsim, sorghum and pigeon pea seeds through a seed fair and direct delivery of seeds to beneficiaries.



<sup>8</sup> The richest household includes two teachers and unlike all other households in the sample, agriculture is not their main economic activity.

The majority of these seeds were used for production (seeds were eaten by the households before planting in just two cases). Figure 10 shows the main crops produced in 2006/7, and Figure 11 shows the main crops produced in 2007/8. Green crops have been added to main crops (e.g. green maize to maize) to reduce the number of categories. The bottom crop

in each graph legend (sorghum in 2006/7, groundnuts in 2007/8) is the crop with the largest production in that year; above that, crops are shown in decreasing order of production i.e. 'all other crops' is the least important in each case. Note that bean production in 2007/8 was extremely low, mainly due to the failure of seeds distributed by an NGO.







Details of ‘All other crops’, including vegetables grown from distributed seeds, are listed in Table 4, in order of total production i.e. in Pader in 2006/7 total mango production was greater than total cow pea production, and so on.

Crops produced from seeds distributed by humanitarian agencies provided between around 4% and 30% of total household energy needs. The household that derived the greatest proportion of its energy requirements from food produced with donated seeds was, unsurprisingly, the smallest household in the study, with just three members. In 2007–08 only eight households sold some produce (mainly groundnuts). This included seven out of the nine households at the top end of the income distribution and one household from the mid-point. None in the poorest half of the sample

sold any of the crops produced from the NGO seed distribution.

**Table 3: ‘All other crops’**

2006/7	2007/8
Mango	Cassava fresh
Cow peas	Mango
Cassava fresh	Beans
Leaves, dark green	Cow peas
Leaves, light green	Leaves, dark green
Sun flower	Tomato
Pumpkin	Onion
	Okra

The idea that seeds would encourage the poor to engage in market activities, as some NGOs had intended, was therefore misjudged. They were needed to meet households' own consumption needs, which is the first priority, with considerations of commerce second. Moreover, some of the seeds provided did not offer a good commercial return, due to low prices in local markets and in the absence of organised producer/commodity groups. However, the produce from the seeds (which included groundnuts) did provide a valuable additional source of protein that poor households might otherwise have purchased, at the expense of basic non-food needs such as soap or school materials. (See Annex 1 for a summary of the seed distribution results found by the study.)

Four households did not receive any seeds. These were all households that had not moved from the main camp, Lira Palwo, at the time of distribution. Two households ate seeds before planting (beans, in both cases). One was among the poorest households, with a disposable income very close to the basic food needs threshold, and the other was in the middle-income range. The explanation is probably that the seeds arrived late, and were a 'replacement' pack, as the first pack was spoilt. Other households had very poor returns from their bean crop.

### 3.3 Asset holding and change in asset holding between 2006–07 and 2007–08

**Table 1: Changes in asset holdings 2006/7–2007/8**

	Average number of items	
	2006/07	2007/08
Hand tools, brick mould	2.00	2.64
Bicycle, bicycle broken	0.25	0.55
Radio, radio broken	0.21	0.29
Basin, pot, chair etc	0.36	0.54
Cart, plough, wheelbarrow, brewing & fishing equipment	0.04	0.29

Average asset holdings increased between 2006-07 and 2007-08, although the level of assets is still extremely low. This reflects the very low disposable incomes of the majority of households. When asked how they would spend any additional income, the majority of households prioritised purchase of basic agricultural tools, hiring draft power and payment of secondary school fees.

Households are thus combining short-term and long-term investments as they plan for the future. The prioritisation of post-primary education is new in Pader, and has been identified in other recent studies and the PDRP. This appears to be a direct outcome of displacement, where secondary education opened the way to NGO jobs and access to vital information on the workings of the aid system.

There was a slight increase in the diversity of assets held in the most recent assessment. Changes in both the number and type of assets held will be monitored in the coming year.

### 3.4 Cultivated land, 2006–07 and 2007–08

Improvements in security over the past year have had a profound impact on land access and the prospect of return to a peacetime agricultural economy.<sup>9</sup> Figure 12 shows changes in the area of land cultivated by each household in the sample between 2006–07 and 2007–08. The bars show the total area of land cultivated by each household. For clarity of presentation, we have combined all categories of land, i.e. owned, rented, borrowed, lowland and upland.

The average area of land cultivated increased, on average, from 1.34 acres in 2006–07 to 3.14 acres in 2007–08. The area cultivated decreased in just three cases. Labour availability was a problem in two of these households, and the area cultivated dropped by two acres in both households. The third (the richest household) reduced the area cultivated by just half an acre. This household is made up of two teachers; agriculture is not their main source of income and paying others to cultivate was a lower priority in 2007–08.

If we divide the population into wealth quartiles, the distribution of households between Aringo Pee (closer to home) and Aywee Keyo (land more distant) is absolutely even in the first (poorest) second and third quartiles. However, in the fourth (wealthiest) quartile, five households are from Aringo Pee and only two from Aywee Keyo. This suggests that, although the amount of land cultivated is similar, people who are already in

<sup>9</sup> Disputes over land access are a major concern in the return process. Half the households in our survey have returned to their own land, and of these none has reported a land dispute. When all households have returned, a review of changes in land access, disputes that have arisen and methods of arbitration used is planned.

Figure 12: Changes in area of land cultivated, 2006/7–2008/9





Figure 13: Livestock holding 2007/8



their home areas are more successful in ~accessing employment (they have higher cash incomes) and appear to be investing more in production.

Village	Quartile 1	Quartile 2	Quartile 3	Quartile 4
Aringo Pee	4	3	4	5
Aywee Keeyo	3	4	3	2

### 3.5 Livestock

Every household in the study lost all their livestock during the conflict; some had holdings of up to 40 or 50 cattle, and large numbers of goats and poultry. Rebel attacks during the conflict period were compounded by Karamojong raids, which continue to threaten the restocking process.

In 2006–07 there were no large or medium livestock (i.e. cattle, goats, pigs or dogs) in the sample population. Despite continuing concerns about cattle raiding, livestock are reappearing in Pader. Figure 13 shows livestock holdings in the study population for 2007–08, in order of ascending DI/AE.

Medium and large livestock are only held by households in the top half of the income distribution.<sup>9</sup> Five of these households now have cattle. These were all acquired through the NUSAF.


### 3.6 Population

There was very little change in the population profile between the two assessments: 96

<sup>10</sup> Dogs are used for hunting and are included in the list, as they were seen as a ‘productive asset’ by the study population.

males and 108 females in 2006–07, and 93 males and 118 females in 2007–08. The population pyramid for 2007–08 is shown in Figure 14.

Note the number of missing youth in the 20 to 25 age group. This age group is an important source of labour, particularly for the heavy work involved in clearing land left uncultivated during years of conflict. The reasons for this apparent shortage of young people need to be more fully understood. The absence of young women may partly be explained by the impact of the conflict (abduction and killing), compounded by poor health services and high rates of maternal mortality. The absence of young men could be due to the conflict and to migration associated with it (fear of abduction or recruitment). Their reluctance to return from urban areas needs further investigation, but is likely to be due to higher living standards and/or lack of employment opportunities in rural areas. The Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) calculated that, of at least 66,000 youths abducted during the conflict, 20% of abducted males and 5% of females have yet to return (Annan et al., 2008).



### 3.7 Reliance on assistance

During the course of the study, the situation in Northern Uganda has improved dramatically. In the context of a return to more normal conditions, a recurrent theme we observed in the discourse of aid agencies, local government and other opinion formers, including religious leaders, has been ‘the

### Box 8: Dependency and initiative

One of the meanings attached to dependency is the idea that the continued provision of relief risks creating a ‘dependency mentality’ or ‘dependency syndrome’, in which relief undermines initiative. All the evidence about how people survive during crises points to the fact that this is an unhelpful myth: relief does not undermine initiative or make people lazy. Recipients of aid are far from passive, but remain engaged in a wide variety of activities, of which aid forms only a part.

(Harvey and Lind, 2005).

dependency syndrome’ (see Box 8 for a succinct summary of Harvey and Lind’s findings on this in their report *Dependency and Humanitarian Relief: A Critical Analysis*). This has been noted by other researchers in Uganda (Levine, 2006), and can be seen in government press releases and media reports (for example, State House, Uganda, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda, no date; IRIN, 2006; Catholic News Service, 2008; Diocese of Northern Uganda, 2006; Africa Foundation, 2007).

The ‘problem’ of dependency is usually understood to be that, after receiving assistance for many years, the displaced people of Northern Uganda have become so accustomed to having their needs met by others that they have lost both the ability and aspiration to pursue independent, self-reliant livelihoods. According to this view, not only the appalling physical conditions in the camps, but also the risk of continued dependency adds urgency to the case for getting people out of the camps and off humanitarian assistance. One solution to this problem, so the argument goes, would be to reduce the amount of assistance people receive and thereby force them to be more independent. This is seen as critical to, and is usually framed within the context of, a transition to development.

With improved security and the peace process over the last two years and the prospect of an end to displacement, discussion of assistance has shifted to transition, recovery and development. This is a reasonable move, and it is not surprising that some relief agencies have left, others are planning their exit, while those who are staying are changing how they frame their work, designing it to fit non-emergency, more developmental, funding streams. However, transition is a process. Northern Uganda is an agricultural economy and people cannot move faster than the annual agricultural cycle. Re-establishing productive

farms in a former war zone also requires inputs and services, from mine clearance to seeds, tools, restocking and animal traction. In these circumstances, critics of the displaced might consider substituting the term ‘aid dependency’ with ‘common sense’.

WFP was faced with the transition problem in September 2007 when it had to convince donors of the likely need for continued general food rations beyond March 2008. WFP felt that donors were unlikely to support further general food rations because of a perceived need to move away from emergency relief programming. The findings from our study, set out in the previous section, endorse WFP’s view that emergency food aid was needed over the last year, and indeed that it will continue to be needed by many people for several years as agricultural productivity is re-established.

WFP’s latest 36-month PRRO (April 2008 to March 2011) anticipates the need to assist people wherever they are located, whether in ‘mother’ camps, TRSs or even in their original home areas, and that it could take up to three years for people to reinstate their livelihoods to allow the phasing out of relief food. The PRRO will be reviewed and changed, as it is implemented according to the changing context, but crucially WFP’s plans are subject to donor support and the availability of funding. WFP’s general food rations were reduced during the last year because of a reduction in donor support, and our data shows a significant impact on households’ food security as a result. In the study area people remained hugely reliant on food aid through 2007, and these cuts to the general food ration affected them significantly.

The findings of our study demonstrate the fallacy of ‘dependency syndrome’. The detailed analysis of household economy set out in the previous charts and discussion captures the achievements of people working unrelentingly to increase their incomes, raise money to put their children through school, break free from their reliance on food aid and regain their status as independent and productive farmers.

Focus groups in Obolokome and Aywee Keyo emphasised that they had no desire to be ‘reliant on the trailer’, a reference to the trailers on which WFP food is delivered. Community members knew that food aid would not continue indefinitely and also pointed out that, while it has been of crucial importance to their survival in past years, it has not been entirely reliable, so anyone wholly reliant on it could face starvation. People expressed great

*We believe the different forms of relief assistance were only provided to enable us live to another day and this has never altered or changed our thinking or way of life ... relief food aid assistance has exacerbated lack of hard work and laziness among some of our people who were already lazy, prior to displacement. Some of these are the people who increase their household size to receive more assistance. They are also the same households who have deliberately delayed their resettlement into the villages.*

Secretary, Local Council II Ademe

frustration at having had to rely on assistance, which never met all their survival needs. On the specific notion of ‘dependency syndrome’, people pointed to themselves and those around them who had returned to the land and had begun to be productive farmers again. Nonetheless, they also explained that there have always been lazy and less motivated people in their community and that receiving minimal lifesaving assistance and healthcare during the past years of war and displacement did not create their habits, nor would it change them. But they are not typical: Jemima and her daughter (Box 9) are far more representative.

#### **Box 9: Jemima**

Jemima is an elderly grandmother who was recently joined by her widowed daughter. There are four children in this female-headed household. Before the conflict, this was a wealthy household, with around 40 cattle and cash income from cotton sales. They are not without ‘social capital’: the school fees of both children in secondary school are paid by relatives, and Jemima gets occasional gifts, such as clothes from a married daughter. However, they have not been able to move out of the main IDP camp, where they have very limited access to land, because they lack the labour to construct a house in the TRS. This meant that they were excluded from the NGO seed distributions which took place in Obolokome and thus have not been able to produce any cash crops.

When asked what they would do with any additional income, they said they would ‘prioritise seeds and renting of additional land as they prepare to return home’. These are not people who are expecting handouts or any easy ride. They want to produce, but they lack the means of production. The household is faced with the additional problem of lack of labour for construction of huts in their original homestead.

### 3.8 Plans for return: protection, livelihoods and aspirations for the future

Over the course of the last two years one question asked repeatedly within the assistance community, both governmental and non-governmental, is ‘when are people going to go home?’. While a massive return occurred in Lira District relatively quickly, the people of Acholi sub-region have so far been reluctant to move back to their original homes. This perplexes aid actors and the government. At the end of last year, following the August peace achievements, there were expectations that people might move home *en masse* as soon as the thatch grass was ready in October or November. The grass dried and became ready, but no large-scale movement occurred.

The reasons people give when asked to explain their decision to move or stay put are well known and the study’s findings reflect the reports of aid actors across Acholiland. Factors given by those in our study area included availability of thatching grass to roof new houses, availability of primary education, availability of clean water, availability of and access to healthcare, access to assistance, especially food aid and potential return packages. In addition to this, the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance, the presence of bandits or thieves and fear of return of the LRA are all factors in people’s decision-making.

Focus group discussions and interviews in our study show that access to roads, markets and services are very important, especially education, water and food aid, as is the ability to build a hut (availability of thatch and labour). However, security remained people’s paramount concern, with consideration of the likelihood of a return to war influencing their judgements. Besides the threat of violence, building new homes is a huge investment: leaving huts in the TRS that people have built at significant cost, and which are likely to be destroyed when they leave, to build new ones at the homestead, is perceived as a huge risk. Much less risky is to maintain the hut in the TRS and, if not able to rent or borrow land nearby, commute to their own more distant fields. Now that people are closer to their original lands in the TRS, this option is more viable than it was in the mother camps. For this reason, a possible scenario that has been suggested is one in which people remain in the current TRS sites, perhaps permanently, and commute to their fields. But our findings in Aywee Keyo suggest otherwise.

#### *The pioneers of Aywee Keyo*

The ‘pioneers’ of Aywee Keyo (that is, those households that have crossed the river and settled around the school and village water pump) illustrate many of the factors that affect how, when and why people move. Some moved there after first spending time in the TRS, while others who could not afford to move twice waited until they were ready to go directly to Aywee Keyo, but in both cases the movements were timed with respect to thatching and schooling. Only a small number of households have moved back to their more isolated, original homesteads; the rest have built a spontaneous ‘camp’ of huts around the borehole and school, and they were expecting more people to come to the site when the thatch was ready later in the year. Focus groups and camp ‘leaders’, who have been put in place by the group themselves, told us that more movement might have occurred last season had there not been a fire that burned a significant amount of thatching. However, they still anticipate people moving to join them at the site, rather than returning all the way to the homesteads, because of the perceived security this offers until there is a resolution to the peace process and it is safe to live on their more isolated homestead lands again.

This consideration of ‘physical security risk’ needs to be separated from people’s consideration of food aid. Although food aid and ‘dependency’ is sometimes blamed for people’s reluctance to return home, our findings show the majority of people in the study remain in need of food aid and would need it whether they fully relocated ‘home’ or not. The issue is not whether food aid *per se* is preventing people from moving, but how people are registered and remain eligible or on distribution lists. Those pioneers who are tentatively making a start in the homesteads are fearful that the less time they spend in the camp site (if they build a hut at the homestead, or if they fully move ‘home’), the more likely they are to be struck from distribution lists, with or without receiving the three-month ‘return package’ that they have heard has been given in other areas.

WFP and the government should communicate to people that their eligibility for food aid is not based on their location, and that those in need of assistance will be able to receive it no matter where they have hut(s) (although they may need to travel to collect it, as it would be impractical to greatly increase the number of distribution points). This could make re-verifications more challenging and, as with any remote distribution, people would have to consider the opportunity and travel costs

in coming to distribution points. However, our findings indicate that a clear message on eligibility for continuing assistance would give people the confidence to spend more time and investment at the homesteads while they await a resolution of the peace process. It would help them re-establish and consolidate their livelihoods, rather than provoking a mass move 'home'.

It is difficult to predict what will happen next. Those looking for the most straightforward solution should certainly look to the peace process, but also recognise that the renewal of services and infrastructure in the home village areas is crucial and will take time and investment. Better and much more recovery assistance is

needed, e.g. large investments in education, water, roads and agriculture that would more rapidly enable people to re-establish themselves when they move and not suffer a major loss of services and living standards as a result. In other words, the key to 'dependency' concerns is not less aid, but rather a great deal more recovery assistance to re-establish livelihoods and provide adequate basic services. Planning under the umbrella of the PRDP, particularly the closure of camps and replacement of camp management structures by the traditional Local Councillor system, therefore needs to adjust to the possibility of a large number of people choosing to remain settled at camp sites and in need of assistance or services.





## 4. Implications for humanitarian programming

Our findings highlight the importance of livelihoods assistance, such as food distributions, seeds and tools and cash for work, but also show that, even when people have been highly reliant on food distributions for some time, their resolve to recover and return to independence, relying on their own production, is huge. But recovery in such a devastated context will take time, and people's need for direct assistance with food or income will not abruptly end. Rather, it will diminish over time. However, identifying who needs the most help and what kind of help is needed during this transition period cannot be resolved by tick-box demographic criteria.

Our data shows that, despite the improved security and increased food production of the last two years, people are still scarcely managing to access enough food, even with food aid received from WFP. While some households are well on their way to self-reliance and some have spoken of being able to forego their food aid entitlements soon, others are far from able to produce or earn enough to feed everyone in their household without assistance, and for many people in our sample the situation has deteriorated over the last year of study, rather than improved. From 36% in the first year of study, 43% of our sample households had insufficient income from all sources to meet their basic needs in the last study year. Inflation, which has seen the price of staple foods such as maize and beans treble in some markets during 2008, may make the situation worse in the coming year (IRIN, 2008). WFP's commitment to assist people whether they are in the mother camp, TRS, or home village is clearly the right position at the present time; however, the transition and 'phase out' of the assistance and handover of this role to government will be difficult.

Some households may be able to recover and prosper after another two to three full agricultural seasons, given the right kind of assistance in their agricultural production (access to seeds, tools and markets). Others lack the household labour (and do not have cash to hire it) necessary to increase their production to a level that can provide for their basic needs. These households may never be able to adequately meet these needs without additional support, and local authorities should consider the most appropriate way of introducing longer-term social protection programmes.

While fear of a return to war is the overwhelming factor in people's decision-making, for most the need for food aid is also significant in determining how and when they move. Being certain that 'returning home' will not cut them off from regular and much-needed food aid (or cash to purchase food) may well have a significant impact on these decisions. People have seen returnees in other areas removed from food aid distributions and given return packages, but for some people this will be insufficient to cover their needs while they clear long-abandoned land and re-establish their livelihoods.

While security may be the most significant factor in determining movement home, WFP will also need to prove that it (or government systems) will support people wherever they are. Communication with affected people is critical so that they understand how decisions are made and how their entitlements may change, should they move back to their homes. Distribution/registration lists are critical here: people need to be sure that moving out of a camp will not mean that they are removed from food aid lists.

As the individual household stories above illustrate, the typical criteria using crude demographics such as household size, age and gender of the head of household, or presence of orphans, are not reliable indicators of need. Thus, we found female-headed households across the wealth distribution – as might be expected at this stage, when a large proportion of income is still provided by WFP rations. The particular vulnerabilities likely to face female-headed households (land access, capacity to cultivate larger areas of land) should become clearer as the resettlement process proceeds, and it is at this stage that a clearer income gap reflecting demography might be revealed. This will be a focus of our next analysis.

The findings in our study area align with others, such as SWAY, which also highlight the errors that arise from crude targeting by category, and the critical need for assistance in agricultural recovery. This need is described by Longley et al. in their wide-ranging study of post-conflict recovery, relief and social protection (Longley, 2006). In this transition period, when livelihoods assistance programming should be expanding, it is imperative that agencies analyse the specific constraints on people's agricultural production.

Information and insights that become available to agencies during this time need to be shared with policy-makers and incorporated into longer-term social protection and development planning.

Given current labour needs, incentives, including payment for land rehabilitation work, might be offered to young Acholis who have migrated to urban areas, encouraging them to return home and contribute to local recovery. In the longer term, their wider experience could provide a new source of entrepreneurship in the local economy. Similarly, targeting the poorest households, that are least able to pay for animal traction, would give households at risk of becoming destitute a chance to re-establish themselves. This group would include single women and elderly households that lack labour power, but which could, with a small amount of capital from the current year's harvest, pay for heavy land clearance work in future years. Interventions of this kind would represent a breakthrough for creative 'social protection' in a post-conflict environment.

However, agencies working on agricultural rehabilitation often target on the basis of 'quick wins', aiming to achieve a rapid, overall increase in production across a wide area – for example, through draft assistance programmes. As currently conceived, many of these will only reach households that have already been able to clear their land, while those households who lack the labour for initial land preparation are left out. Such an approach traps many resource-poor households in a position that is little different from the 'emergency' context, and assists those who are actually better able to recover on their own. Recovery programmes need to be more multi-faceted. For example, animal traction projects could incorporate cash transfers to labour-poor households so that they can hire labour to clear land.

One of the most salient messages the study has received through its discussions with affected people in Lira Palwo, Obolokome and Aywee Keyo is the overwhelming and widespread desire to get back to the land and re-establish self-reliant livelihoods. People are highly motivated, and whenever they are able to, they are making the investments that are needed to secure independent livelihoods in the future. This project has been recording a heroic story of recovery in action as people strive to increase their agriculture production. Some households are clearly more

#### **Box 10: Key implications for assistance programming**

- Continued food aid will be necessary for some time and this need will not end abruptly, even with the 'best case' i.e. a resolved peace process and massive return. Some households have seen a worsening of their food security over the last study year; many households will take several years to become fully self-reliant.
- Others will require long-term assistance (the unsupported elderly, the disabled). It is important that these households are incorporated into the social protection programmes currently being piloted in other parts of Uganda.
- Targeting of different types of livelihood assistance, food aid, 'social cash transfers', cash for work, agriculture, asset replacement, microfinance, etc. based on coarse demographics or self-selection can have significant exclusion errors: better understanding of agricultural methods and livelihood systems will improve targeting methods.
- If the peace process is not resolved and people remain reluctant to risk a full return to their homesteads, programming will need to adapt to the reality of partial return: basic infrastructure to provide safe water, sanitation, education and healthcare is still greatly needed in TRSs and spontaneous camps in addition to original village areas. This cannot wait until everyone has moved back to their original homes; further direct assistance needs to be delivered wherever people are living, whether in camp sites or homesteads, and registration/distribution systems need to be adapted to ensure that people who do leave camps are not excluded.
- A reduction in standard of living measured over the last study period suggests a gap between the level of previous emergency programming and today's transitional programming in the study area. Shortfalls in WFP and CAP funding need to be addressed by donors, and more progress in realising the service delivery planned by the PDRP is urgently needed.

successful than others, and the reasons at this stage in the resettlement process are not hard to identify. The main constraints the less successful

households currently face are a lack of labour, or a lack of cash to hire labour and/or draft power. These are problems that recovery assistance programmes could address through targeted projects. Furthermore, there is clearly a gap between services such as water and education at camp sites and those people have access to if they move home. The Parish Approach and PDRP rightly aim to address this; however, 30–40% of the estimated \$540 million for the PDRP does not represent additional GoU funding, and this sum also includes commitments made by the UN system (OPM, 2008b), whose CAP is only 50% funded halfway through the budget year (OCHA, 2008b). There is therefore likely to be a continuing gap between recovery and service needs in return areas.

Following the main harvest in August this year, the study will make the first of the bi-annual data collection exercises for the IHM analysis and look at how this year's assistance programmes to boost agriculture production have helped people in the study area. The initial indications for the last six months are not good. The peace process continues to drag on without resolution, and people still live in uncertainty; this could mean that few households will move back home when the thatch is ready in October and November. A worse than expected harvest due to bad weather, continued breaks in food ration distributions and rising malnutrition rates in neighbouring districts are worrying, and may mean that people's standard of living has not improved as much as was hoped earlier in the year.



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## Annex 1: Characteristics of wealth groups

Wealth characteristics Local name	'Poor' (Acan oyere)	'Middle' (Acan-Pekun)	'Better-off' (Olonyo-oyeru)
% of total households	45–65%	25–30%	15–20%
Typical number of wives <sup>11</sup>	1	1 or 2	1 or 2
Typical household size	Between 6 and 8 people including at least one orphan	Between 6 and 8 sometimes including an orphan	Between 5 and 7 including at least one orphan
Typical land cultivated at TRS	1–2 acres	1.5–3 acres	3–4 acres and 1 acre for cotton
Typical land cultivated at former mother camps	1. 25–2 acres	3–4 acres and ½ acre cotton	4–5 acres and 1 acre for cotton and 1 acre for rice in Omot
Cash crops	G.nuts, simsim, cassava	G.nuts, simsim, sunflower, millet, soya beans	G.nuts, simsim, sunflower, millet, Cotton, rice, soya beans
Cattle	0	0–2	1–8, including 1–2 received from government (NUSAF)
Goats	0–3	1–5	2–8
Pigs	0–1	0–2	0
Chicken	0–1 hen, 5 chicks	0–2 hens, 1 cock, 10 chicks	0–4 hens, 2 cocks, 15 chicks
Ducks	0–6	0–6	0–6
Bicycles	0	0–1	1
Hand tools	3–4 hoes, 1 each of axe, panga, spade	3–4 hoes, 1 each of axe, panga, spade	3–4 hoes, 1 each of axe, panga, spade
Ox plough	0	0–1	0–2
Typical economic activities TRS	Cultivation and sale of own food crops	Cultivation and sale of own food crops	Cultivation and sale of own food crops
	Agricultural labour on others' farms	Breeding and selling small livestock	Cultivation and sale of cotton
	Off-farm labour (brick making, thatching, construction of pit latrines)	Brewing	Formal employment
	Sale of charcoal & firewood	Fishing & hunting	Retail trade
	Local crafts, i.e. pots, winnowers, hoe & axe handles, mats, ropes, knives.	Manufacture and sale of charcoal	Breeding and selling cattle and goats
	Brewing	Collecting and selling fire wood	Remittance

<sup>11</sup> Female-headed households were found in all wealth groups. The HEA (unlike the IHM) describes 'typical' households, and across all wealth groups households are typically made up of married couples. Poorer males are more likely to have only one wife.

## Annex 1: Characteristics of wealth groups (continued)

Wealth characteristics Local name	'Poor' (Acan oyere)	'Middle' (Acan-Pekun)	'Better-off' (Olonyo-oyeru)
	Participating in NGO Cash for work projects	Carpentry work	Hire of oxen
	Fishing & hunting	Sale of bricks	
		Petty trade	
		Local crafts, i.e. pots, winnowers, hoe & axe handles, mats, ropes, knives.	
		Remittance	
Typical economic activities former mother camps <sup>12</sup>	Cultivation and sale of own food crops	Cultivation and sale of own food crops	Cultivation and sale of cotton and rice
	Agricultural labour on others' farms	Sale of small livestock	Local food stockist for trade
	Off farm labour (brick making, brewing, thatching, pit latrine construction, sand extraction)	Manufacture and sale of charcoal	Retail shops e.g. clothes
	Manufacture and sale of charcoal	Brewing	Sale of livestock & butchery
	Collecting and selling fire wood	Petty trade (food stuff)	Formal employment higher salaries
	Local crafts ( pots, winnowers, hoe & axe handles, mats, ropes )	Carpentry (chairs, stools & tables)	Hire of oxen & ox ploughs
	Land rental	Local crafts (pottery, mats, ropes, hoe & axe handles)	Sewing machines & phone call trade
	Cottage industry (cobblers, repair of bicycles)	Formal employment lower grade local government employees such as parish chiefs	Local contracts
		Cottage industry (bicycle repair, boda -boda)	

<sup>12</sup> The wealthiest group was likely to be part of the host community, because they had the best access to land and social networks and often higher levels of education.



## Annex 2: IHM definitions and terms

In order to compare the income and standard of living of different households:

(a) food and non-food income have been converted to an equivalent common measure: i.e. '*kilo calories*'

(b) to establish comparability between households of different size and composition, results have been standardised in terms of '*adult equivalents*'; and finally,

(c) to compare household income, results are expressed in terms of '*disposable income per adult equivalent*'. Disposable income is the amount of income that would remain after the household has met only its basic food energy requirement; but

(d) to consider the extent to which households can meet their minimum set of needs, including both food and non-food essentials, a basic '*standard of living*' threshold has been set. Households below the standard of living threshold do not have sufficient disposable income/adult equivalent to meet these basic needs.

(i) Households in the sample obtain their income partly as food produced for consumption, partly as cash (from the sale of crops, remittances, gifts from relatives) partly as food aid and partly as wild food. Converting all income into its money equivalent runs into the difficulty that some items of food produced (e.g. fruits) do not have a 'market price': they cannot be sold in the volumes produced. To compare the relative contribution of these different sources of income, all income is converted into its approximate *kilo calorie (kcal)* equivalent. Thus, cash income is converted into the kcal maize (per adult equivalent) that could be purchased with the cash earned.

(ii) To compare households of different sizes and with different demographic characteristics, results are expressed per '*adult equivalent*'. The number of adult equivalents is given by weighting the requirement of each member of the household according to their age and sex, based on WHO (1984) estimates of their different food energy requirements. For example an adult male will be equal to one adult equivalent, while an eight-year-old girl would be equal to 0.83 adult equivalent.

(iii) *Disposable income*: As food produced by the household and received as food aid is less than the amount required to meet basic needs, any unmet household food requirement is 'purchased' in the IHM model, at the price prevailing in the study period, and the cost of purchase subtracted from the household's money income. The amount remaining, when basic food needs have been met, is termed 'disposable income'.

(iv) A minimum *standard of living* has been defined as the ability of a household to meet:

- basic household expenses i.e. kerosene/candles; household utensils, salt;
- personal expenses i.e. clothing, soap and medical costs; and
- primary school costs including books, uniforms and school materials.

These costs are allocated to each household, based on the number and age of household members. The cost of these items is based on local market prices.

### Annex 3: Basic quantitative results of seed distributions in study area - 2006/2007 3 separate distributions from 3 agencies

HH no	Quantity purchased with NGO seedfair vouchers/donated	Quantity sown	Yield	kg seeds consumed	kg harvest sold	kg harvest consumed	% household kcal requirement
1	3 1/2 basins (unshelled)	1 basin shelled (all)	54 Kg	0kg	0kg	54kg	4.10%
2	3 basins, 5 cups, 5 cups , 5 cups & 1/2 kg respectively	All	96kg, 18kg, 5.5 kg, 10 kg & 30kg respectively	0kg	72 kg	18kg, 18kg, 5.5 kg, 10 kg & 30 kg respectively	3.40%
3	3 1/2 basins(unshelled), 5kg and 5 cups of 1/2 kg respectively	All	72kg, 0kg, and 15kg respectively	0kg	36kg	36 kg and 15 kg respectively	3.9% & 0.1%
4	3 basins of G.nuts, 1 basin beans & 5 kg of beans, 1/2 kg garden peas & Malakwang	1 basin of beans = 18 kg	90 kg & 10kg for garden peas & malakwang respectively	18 kg	0kg	90kg and 10kg each of gardens peas & malakwang	7.8% & 0.1%
5	32 basins G.nuts, pigeon peas = 12.5 kg & sorghum = 25 kg	32 basins G.nuts, pigeon peas = 12.5 kg & sorghum = 25 kg	198kg of G.nuts, 54 kg of pigeon peas & 108 kg of sorghum	0kg	0kg	198kg of G.nuts, 54 kg of pigeon peas & 108 kg of sorghum	18%, 3 % & 6.3% respectively
6	2 basins, 9kg, 2.5 kg, 10kg, 12.5 kg and 10kg respectively & 5 kg of beans, 1/2kg of garden peas & malakwang respectively	All except 10kg of beans	436kg, 18kg, 108kg, 1kg & 60kg respectively. Negligible yields from one distribution	10kg	6kg of G.nuts	436kg, 18kg, 108kg, 1kg & 60kg respectively.	4.5%, 1.6%, 10%, 0.4% & 9.3% respectively
7	4 basins of G.nut	All	54 kg, but Negligible yields from one distribution	0kg	0kg	54kg of G.nuts	6.80%

HH no	Quantity purchased with NGO seedfair vouchers/donated	Quantity sown	Yield	kg seeds consumed	kg harvest sold	kg harvest consumed	% household kcal requirement
8	2 1/2 basins, 25kg, 12.5kg, 25kg, 2 kg & 5kg & 1/2 kg for garden peas & malakwang	All except 21kg of sorghum & 6kg of simsim	198kg of G.nuts, 108kg sorghum, simsim = 50kg 36 kg of pigeon peas & 10 of green vegetables.	0kg	0kg	198kg, 108kg, 50kg, 36 kg & 10kg respectively	17.5%, 8.3%, 7.7% 2.2% & 1.3 % respectively
9	0kg	0kg	0kg	0kg	0kg	0kg	0kg
10	2 basin, 25kg & 15 kg respectively	All	90kg, 36 kg & 40kg for caritas & 40kg of garden peas	0kg	0kg	90kg, 36 kg & 40kg for & 40kg of garden peas	4.5%, 2.8% 5.1% respectively & 0.4% of garden peas
11	G.nuts= 3 basins, simsim= 4kg, pigeon peas = 8kg sorghum =8kg and sunflower= 4kg	All	360kg, 80kg, 54kg, 108kg & 10kg, 40 & 45 kg for garden peas & malakwang	0kg	36 kg of G.nuts	270kg, 80kg, 54kg, 108kg & 10kg & 40 & 45 kg	19.8%, 5.6%, 2.2%, 4.5% respectively & 0.1% & 0.2%
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	Groundnuts=3/4 basin, sorghum= 36kg, pigeon peas= 7.5 kg & simsim 13 kg	All	126kg, ---, 54kg & 75 kg simsim	0kg	0kg	108kg, --, 54kg & 75kg respectively	2.4%, ---, 2.75 & 6.4% respectively
14	G.nuts= 2 1/4 basin, pigeon peas = 12.5 kg & sorghum 12.5 kg	All except 7.5 kg of sorghum & 20kg of pigeon peas	18kg, 18kg & 108 kg of sorghum	7.5kg sorghum & 20 kg of pigeon peas	0Kg	9kg, 18kg & 108kg of sorghum-, 80kg garden peas & 25kg of malakwang	2.4%, 1.3% and 8.3% & 0.5% & 0.3%

HH no	Quantity purchased with NGO seedfair vouchers/donated	Quantity sown	Yield	kg seeds consumed	kg harvest sold	kg harvest consumed	% household kcal requirement
15	Groundnuts= 23/4 basin & pigeon peas = 12.5 kg	All, except pigeon peas= consumed 10.5kg	171kg, 60kg respectively	10.5kg	72kg	99kg, 60kg	0
16	0	0	0	0		0	0
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	Groundnut = 3 basins & 34 kg of sorghum	All groundnuts, but consumed 34kg of sorghum	117kg of G.nuts & 162 kg of sorghum	0Kg	36kg	71kg & 162 kg respectively	8.5% & 12.5% respectively
19	Groundnuts= 1/1/2 basins, beans =12.5 kg & 6.25 kg of simsim	All	189kg, 27kg & 20kg	0Kg	72Kg	117kg, 2kg & 20kg	17.6%, 2.4% & 3.1% respectively
20	G.nuts = 3 basins, soya beans =31/2 kg & pigeon peas = 12.5 kg	All	198kg, 0kg & 18kg respectively 25 kg of garden peas	0Kg	27kg	135kg & 18kg respectively & 25kg	32.1%, G.nuts, 2.7% pigeon peas & 0.5%
21	G.nut = 4 basins	All	108kg	0kg	0kg	72kg	9.10%
22	G.nuts= 2 basins, simsim= 6.25kg, pigeon peas = 12.5kg & beans =12.5 kg	All except pigeon peas= 12.5 kg	162kg,120kg & 88kg for G.nuts respectively	0kg	36 Kg G.nuts	90kg, 110kg & 88kg respectively	6.8%, 8.5% & 3.9%
23	Groundnuts 2 basins, pigeon peas= 8kg, beans= 9kg, simsim =5kg , millet 1/2 kg and garden peas = 8kg	All	216kg, 54kg, 27kg, 60kg, 0kg & 16kg	0kg	0kg	216kg, 54kg, 27kg, 60kg, 0kg & 16 kg	13.5%, 2.0%, 1.0%, 3.95, 0% & 0.1%
24	Groundnuts	All	54 kg of G.nuts, the rest failed	0kg	0kg	54Kg of G.nuts	5.80%
25	1/1/4 basin of G.nuts, 12.5kg simsim & 25kg of sorghum	All	90kg,40kg & 108 kg &	0kg	0kg	72kg of G.nuts, 40 kg of simsim & 108 kg sorghum	9.8%, 5.1% & 7.7 % respectively

HH no	Quantity purchased with NGO seedfair vouchers/donated	Quantity sown	Yield	kg seeds consumed	kg harvest sold	kg harvest consumed	% household kcal requirement
26	4 basins of G.nut	1/1 basin of g.nuts = 0.25 kg consumed	81kg of G.nuts	0.25kg	0kg	72kg of G.nuts	8.7% only G.nuts
27	3 basin of G.nuts & 15 kg of pigeon peas & 5kg beans, 1/2 kg of garden peas & malakwang	All	126Kk, 18Kg Negligible yields from one distribution	0kg	0kg	108kg, 18kg respectively	16.3% & 1.6%
28	3 1/4 basin G.nuts, 8kg pigeon peas & 5kg beans & 1/2 kg of garden peas & malakwang	All	162kg, 18kg & 20kg and 32 kg of garden peas & malakwang respectively	0kg	0kg	96kg, 18kg & 20kg, 32 kg respectively	8.5%, 1.0% & 01. & 0.2% respectively



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